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A B S T R A C T
The paper models the consequences of committee report
allocation for political representation in the European Parlia-
ment (EP). The range of legislators involved in each policy
area affects the values, interests and constituencies that the
Parliament represents. Thus, representation is defined as an
MEP’s participation in salient policy areas. The allocation of
salient reports follows inter- and intra-party group dynam-
ics. First, party groups compete for salient reports in a
context of open voting rules in committee and plenum.
Second, group coordinators distribute these reports among
their MEPs in an attempt to maximize the cohesion of the
group. The model is tested on data from the fifth European
Parliament (1999–2002). The results confirm the impact of
selective participation on political representation. The EP has
evolved into a ‘normal’ Parliament featuring coalitions and
competition along a left–right cleavage across party groups
and a hierarchical allocation of legislative spoils within
parties.
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Introduction
Over the past 20 years, the European Parliament (EP) has assumed increas-
ing power within the European Union’s political system. This was accom-
panied by growing interest in the ‘democratic credentials’ of the European
Union (EU) and its Parliament. Research on political representation in the EU,
however, has either taken a macro-level approach (for a discussion of this
literature see, e.g., Follesdal and Hix, 2005) or focused on the role of European
elections in selecting appropriate representatives (e.g. Van der Eijk and
Franklin, 1996; Norris and Franklin, 1997; Schmitt and Thomassen, 1999).
Yet the solution to the so-called democratic deficit does not lie solely in
the institutional set-up of the European Union or the social make-up of its
Parliament. Rather, it is the legislative participation of individual MEPs that
determines whose opinions are represented. As Hall (1996) points out in his
seminal study on participation in the US Congress, purposive legislators
engage in different legislative activities and policy areas depending on the
structure of opportunities and constraints that they face. Similarly to
Congress, such ‘selective participation’ has wide-ranging consequences for
political representation in the European Parliament. The range of members
involved in legislative business, be it in committees or in the plenum, deter-
mines the values, interests and constituencies that the Parliament represents.
Consistent representational bias could undermine the legitimacy of a fledg-
ling supranational parliamentary system.
Nevertheless, little is known about the legislative participation of indi-
vidual MEPs outside roll-call voting sessions. This paper contributes to filling
this gap by developing and testing a model of political representation in the
allocation of committee reports in the European Parliament. Which MEPs
obtain the most salient committee reports? And what are the consequences
for constituency representation? The paper conceives reports as legislative
tools used by individual legislators to represent the preferences of their
national parties. The study contributes to the existing research programmes
on political representation, report allocation and the internal organization of
the European Parliament.
I first introduce a conception of political representation based on the
legislative participation of individual MEPs. I then discuss existing studies of
report allocation in the European Parliament and outline the contribution of
this paper to the research programme. My theoretical model explains the
consequences of selective participation in committee reports for political
representation and derives a set of hypotheses to be tested in the next section.
I conclude with a summary of the results and an indication of possible areas
for future research.
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Political representation and representational focus in the EP
Most students of the European Parliament have analysed ‘indirect represen-
tation’, or what Pitkin (1967) calls descriptive or formalistic notions of repre-
sentation. Indirect representation occurs when voters select like-minded
representatives to implement policies that are in their interest (Wlezien, 2004).
Research on indirect representation asks how and to what extent the range
of political opinions within the public is translated into parliamentary seats.
In the European Parliament, this literature has focused on either European
elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Bowler and Farrell, 1993; Van der Eijk and
Franklin, 1996; Carrubba, 2001), or representative role perceptions
(Thomassen and Schmitt, 1997; Katz, 1997, 1999; Marsh and Wessels, 1997;
Schmitt and Thomassen, 1999, 2000; Wessels, 1999), or the social character-
istics of representatives (Norris and Franklin, 1997). Most of this research has
concluded that representation in the EP works only moderately well at best:
the electoral connection is weaker than in domestic parliamentary systems,
MEPs have different preferences on specific policy issues than their
constituents, and the EP as a whole is socially quite unrepresentative.
In contrast, ‘direct’ or – in Pitkin’s (1967) words – ‘substantive’ represen-
tation refers to policy responsiveness in the legislative behaviour of sitting
politicians (Wlezien, 2004). This research programme investigates to what
extent the political preferences of European citizens are reflected in the legisla-
tive behaviour of their representatives and in the policy outcomes they
produce. As Moravcsik and Sangiovanni (2002) point out, we can determine
EU responsiveness to underlying national moods by measuring the impact
of constituency preferences on policy and regulatory outcomes at the
European level. Most of this literature has focused on normative questions
and the institutional setup of the EU (Scharpf, 1999; Majone, 2000; Moravc-
sik, 2002; Crombez, 2003; Follesdal and Hix, 2005).
This paper adds an empirical dimension to the research programme on
‘direct representation’ in the EP. In line with Wlezien’s (2004) definition,
policy responsiveness is a function of the legislative behaviour of individual
MEPs. Representation occurs when MEPs engage in policy areas that are
important to their constituents and thus follows what others have called a
‘competence logic’ (Schmitt and Thomassen, 2000). The more competently
legislators address policy issues that are salient to those they represent, the
better their representational performance. Conversely, the more energy repre-
sentatives expend on policy areas that are not of interest to constituents, the
lower their representational performance. Thus, ‘selective participation’ in a
small number of legislative activities and policy areas has direct implications
for political representation (Hall, 1996).
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Such a behavioural conception of political representation does not,
however, answer the question of the appropriate representational focus.
Table 1 shows the results of a survey in which MEPs were asked who they
think they should represent. It becomes immediately clear that national party
voters and the constituency or country, respectively, are at the centre of most
MEPs’ representational roles. More than 70% of MEPs see their role primarily
as representing the people in their country, followed closely by 67% who are
very concerned about representing their national party voters. The narrow-
est (special groups) and the widest (all Europeans) representational foci are
far less popular, with 21% and 41% respectively.
Thus, territorial (country) and ideological (party) cleavages define the
representational roles of MEPs. However, a plethora of recent empirical
research has confirmed that ideological politics has gradually come to
dominate legislative decision-making in the European Parliament. In an in-
depth study of MEPs’ roll-call voting records over the full five terms of the
European Parliament, Hix et al. (forthcoming, 2004), for instance, find that the
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Table 1 Representational foci of MEPs (%)
All people All people Party Special
in Europe in country Constituency voters groups
Austria 30 70 60 80 50
Belgium 39 44 72 67 11
Denmark 25 63 13 75 –
Finland 18 91 73 73 9
France 44 56 31 61 14
Germany 63 57 59 50 17
Greece 73 91 55 64 27
Ireland 44 89 89 89 33
Italy 65 74 41 50 20
Luxembourg – 75 75 75 25
Netherlands 48 76 5 86 14
Portugal 31 81 56 38 19
Spain 42 67 69 78 28
Sweden 21 64 57 71 14
UK 29 54 79 50 14
EU-15 40.86 70.13 55.6 67.13 21.07
Source: Adapted from Wessels (1999).
Notes: Figures are percentages of representatives who indicated that the respective focus is of
great importance to them (values 6 and 7 on a 7-point scale, where 1 indicates little importance
and 7 great importance). Note that in the 1999 European elections most countries had only one
electoral district, with the exception of the UK (12) and Belgium (3).
legislative behaviour of MEPs is more closely aligned with their national party
than with their European party group or their territorial constituency. Simi-
larly, Jun (2003) notes that national parties are crucial in determining MEP
behaviour in budgetary discharge votes. Høyland (2005) also finds systematic
differences in the voting behaviour of MEPs along ideological lines. Finally,
Whitaker (2001, 2005) concludes that national parties have increased their
power over policy outcomes at the European level by assuming greater control
over committee assignments and the direction of committee business as the
powers of the EP increased. In line with these findings, the discussion in this
paper focuses on national party voters as an MEP’s primary constituency.
Of course, incentives to represent the party constituency vary across
national political systems. Hix (2004) as well as Farrell and Scully (2002) show
that the domestic political systems in which MEPs compete for votes differ
dramatically. In some member states, electoral districts are small, candidate
selection is highly centralized and ballots for European elections are closed,
which attributes substantial selection powers to the party leadership (Hix,
2004). MEPs from these countries are likely to be particularly concerned with
representing the preferences of their national parties. As Kreppel (2002) notes,
party influence over electoral lists may give rise to a true ‘electoral connec-
tion’ between MEPs and their national parties, if not their home electorate.
In other member states, selection procedures are more decentralized, with
open ballots and larger districts, which reduces candidate dependency on the
party leadership (Hix, 2004). Any empirical assessment of political represen-
tation must therefore account for differences in electoral systems across
member states.
This section has introduced a conception of ‘direct’ political representa-
tion based on the policy responsiveness of individual legislators. The remain-
der of this paper applies this conception of representation to committee
reports in the European Parliament.
Committee reports in the European Parliament
Most scholars agree that the production of legislative reports is one of the
most important elements of parliamentary committee work (Mamadouh and
Raunio, 2001, 2003; Corbett et al., 2003; Kaeding, 2004, 2005). Indeed, the
system of rapporteurships enables individual legislators to take responsibility
for, and exert influence over, the policy position of the Parliament as a whole.
As Benedetto (2005: 67) notes, the distribution of reports among MEPs ‘allows
us to conclude which parties and nationalities . . . have an impact on the
content of European legislation’. Thus, maybe more than in other legislative
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activities, ‘selective participation’ in committee reports considerably affects
the range of political opinions that are represented in a particular policy area.
This section describes the process of report allocation and discusses previous
research on committee reports.
Topics for reports either are forwarded from the Council or the
Commission under the different decision-making procedures or they arise at
the initiative of an individual MEP. Despite the introduction of quotas on
own-initiative reports in 1994, the workload of the Parliament has continued
to increase in tandem with its policy influence (Corbett et al., 2003). As Table 2
illustrates, the number of reports has risen by 20% over the 10-year period.
One in five reports in the fifth Parliament fell under the co-decision procedure,
where the European Parliament acts as a co-legislator with the Council of
Ministers (Crombez, 1997; Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000). Most reports in the fifth
Parliament were written in the Environment committee, followed by Justice
and Home Affairs. In the previous legislature, Economics and Environment
were vastly more prolific than other committees.
Each time a committee takes on a report, a rapporteur is nominated to
draw up a draft text for approval by the committee. The bidding system
within each committee favours a proportional allocation of reports among
party groups according to the size of their delegation. At the same time, the
system allows for a substantial amount of horse-trading among groups
(Corbett et al., 2003). Group coordinators allocate the reports they have won
to ‘their’ MEPs. Once nominated, rapporteurs are in charge of researching,
writing and defending their text in committee and plenum, where it is voted
upon by all members under the open rule. The open rule ensures that the
report does not stray far from the median MEP in the legislature, regardless
of the party affiliation or policy preferences of the rapporteur.
Several recent studies have analysed the factors that determine report
allocation in the EP. Benedetto (2005) explains the distribution of reports
among party groups and member states as part of an ‘institutionalised
consensus’ within the EP. Mamadouh and Raunio (2001, 2003) and Kreppel
(2002) single out national party delegations as ‘key gatekeepers’ within each
party group. They find that intra-party group allocation is largely propor-
tional to the size of national parties, whereas ‘partisan interests drive the allo-
cation process’ across groups (Mamadouh and Raunio, 2001). In contrast,
Høyland (2005) shows that governing and opposition parties have different
strategies for spending their rights to co-decision reports. Governing parties
aim to write as many reports as possible, whereas ‘opposition parties choose
their involvement more carefully’. Whitaker (2001) focuses on the role of
group coordinators who bid on behalf of their groups and allocate reports to
individual MEPs. As he points out, ‘co-ordinators, at least subject to their
European Union Politics 7(4)5 1 0
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Table 2 Number of reports by committee in the fourth and fifth parliaments
1994–1999 1999–2004
Committee All
Co-
decision Committee All
Co-
decision
Economics 288 73 Environment (ENVI) 263 152
Environment 207 86 Justice & Home
Affairs (LIBE)
254 19
Transport 165 27 Legal Affairs &
Internal Market (JURI)
229 82
External Economic
Relations
129 1 Trade, Research &
Energy (INDU)
219 50
Foreign Affairs 127 0 Economic and
Monetary Affairs
(ECON)
190 35
Legal Affairs 117 45 Budgetary Control
(CONT)
176 3
Agriculture 115 3 Foreign Affairs,
Democracy & Human
Rights (AFET)
153 2
Energy & Research 113 17 Agriculture & Rural
Development (AGRI)
147 15
Fisheries 112 0 Regional Policy,
Transport & Tourism
(RETT)
147 78
Budgets 104 2 Budgets (BUDG) 144 10
Employment 99 12 Fisheries (PESC) 133 0
Civil Liberties 97 4 Employment & Social
Affairs (EMPL)
109 30
Budgetary Control 84 2 Development and
Cooperation (DEVE)
73 18
Culture 75 30 Constitutional Affairs
(AFCO)
56 3
Development 73 4 Culture, Youth,
Education, Media &
Sport (CULT)
51 25
Regional Policy 70 2 Women's Rights &
Equal Opps (FEMM)
45 8
Rules of Procedure 35 0 Petitions (PETI) 23 0
Women's Rights 32 2
Institutional Affairs 24 0
Petitions 12 0
TOTAL 2078 310 TOTAL 2412 530
% Co-decision 15 % Co-decision 22
Sources: Corbett et al. (2003); http://www.europarl.eu.int.
Note: Committee abbreviations in brackets are used throughout the empirical analysis.
personalities, have the potential to dominate committee activities and usurp
the position of chair’.
From a slightly different angle, Kaeding’s (2004, 2005) contributions focus
on the level of individual MEPs. He shows that, in the Environment
committee in the fourth Parliament, the group of rapporteurs did not mirror
the composition of the legislature. Rather, rapporteurs tended to be (relatively
pro-European) experts in the policy area that the report addresses. In a further
analysis over several committees, Kaeding (2005) confirms that the ‘world of
committee reports’ is characterized by disproportionality. Rapporteurs tend
to be high demanders in the policy area that their report addresses. Whereas
small member states focus on a restricted range of committees that are most
important to them, larger member states are involved in all policy areas.
All of these studies have greatly enhanced our understanding of report
allocation in the European Parliament. National parties and party group coor-
dinators determine how reports are distributed along partisan lines. Policy
expertise, attitudes towards European integration and the governing status
of the national party affect an MEP’s chances of obtaining a report. By
accumulating policy expertise, building consensus among party groups and
negotiating with the Council and the Commission, individual rapporteurs can
acquire considerable leverage over policy outcomes at the European level
(Mamadouh and Raunio, 2003).
Nevertheless, no study to date systematically investigates the conse-
quences of report allocation for political representation in the European
Parliament. As Benedetto (2005) recognizes, the selection of rapporteurs
determines the range of political opinions that are represented in the policy
positions of the European Parliament. Similarly, Mamadou and Raunio (2001)
call for research on the effect of committee report allocation on EP legitimacy.
The next section develops a theoretical model of political representation in
committee reports and derives four hypotheses to be tested in subsequent
sections.
Representation and report allocation in the EP
Like in national legislatures, representation in the European Parliament
requires that party groups compete in elections and organize cohesively to
implement their political platforms (Attinà, 1992; Andeweg, 1995; Van der
Eijk and Franklin, 1996; Hix and Lord, 1997). In the inter-party mode, parties
compete against one another for influence over policy, important offices
within the legislature and/or the favours of the electorate. Within the party,
hierarchy determines the interaction between rank-and-file members and the
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leadership (Weingast and Marshall, 1988; Müller, 2000; Boucek, 2002). This
section uses the distinction between inter- and intra-party politics to develop
a model of political representation in EP committee reports.
Most observers associate legislative politics primarily with the inter-party
mode, where the governing coalition and the opposition confront one another,
publicly debate policy issues and make decisions about a variety of policy
alternatives. As long as a party (or a coalition of parties) holds a majority of
votes in the legislature it determines the direction of policy and the alloca-
tion of parliamentary offices and other spoils. In the case of EP reports, this
‘tyranny of the majority’ is enforced under the open rule in the committee
and in the plenum. The open rule in effect gives the majority coalition a veto
over the contents of each report and forces minority MEPs to seek the support
of (at least parts) of the majority in order to get their reports adopted. Thus,
‘opposition’ MEPs have little policy incentive to sign up for the most salient
reports that are coveted by most party groups. In many cases, the prospect
of defending the majority’s report in the plenum and in conciliation is less
appealing than trying to amend reports in committee or from the plenary
backbenches. As a result, the distribution of salient reports mirrors coalition
dynamics in the Parliament.
Scholars of coalition formation in the roll-call voting behaviour of MEPs
have stressed different aspects of party group interaction. Some commen-
tators emphasize the consensual nature of coalitions in the European
assembly. High majority thresholds and an institutional structure that defines
the Parliament in opposition to the Council of Ministers and the Commission
undermine competition among party groups. According to these studies, the
EP is dominated by ‘grand coalitions’ between the two main party groups,
the European People’s Party (EPP) and the Party of European Socialists (PES)
(e.g. Bardi, 1994; Hix and Lord, 1997; Kreppel and Hix, 2003; Benedetto, 2005).
Some more recent research on roll-call votes maintains that left–right policy
preferences drive coalition formation. Most recently, Hix et al. (forthcoming)
for instance find that the largest party group in the fifth Parliament, the
conservative EPP, is more likely to coalesce with its closest partner along the
left–right axis, the European Liberal Democrat and Reform group (ELDR), in
order to form a winning majority than with the second-largest group (PES).
Thus, if the distribution of salient reports mirrors coalition dynamics, MEPs
from EPP and ELDR should write more salient reports than their peers from
other party groups. Propped up by the double open rule in committee and
plenum, EPP and ELDR legislators are able to represent their constituents in
the policy areas that matter most to them. Extremist MEPs whose policy pref-
erences are far from the median in the plenum, on the contrary, write reports
only in the least salient policy areas.
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H1: MEPs whose party group forms part of the voting majority in the plenum (EPP
and ELDR) write more salient reports than do MEPs from other party groups.
Inter-party competition is not the only dynamic at work in Western politi-
cal systems. Parties are composed of individual members with their own
policy preferences, constituencies and status within the party hierarchy. As
Boucek (2002: 454) notes, ‘parties are not unitary actors but collections of indi-
viduals . . . with common but also divergent preferences and interests and
with competing claims on party resources’. In these circumstances, the party
group leadership must ensure the cohesion of the group by balancing the
claims of party elites and rank-and-file without endangering the ‘brand name’
of the group (Boucek, 2002).1 In other words, cohesion is maintained, first, by
distributing the group’s resources so as to give all members a stake in its
efficient operation and, second, by rewarding MEPs with policy preferences
that are representative of the group.
First, parties ensure cohesion by influencing the behaviour of their
members through the ‘distribution of resources’ (Weingast and Marshall,
1988: 159). As Hix (2002) points out, it is the larger national parties that essen-
tially run the party groups. As a result, some MEPs from larger delegations
take on less salient reports because their parties are involved in most
committees, across a wide range of policy areas. By contrast, MEPs from
smaller national parties have little power over the policy direction and the
internal workings of their group. Instead, as Kaeding (2005) has shown at the
level of the member states, they use their limited resources to focus on a small
range of policy areas that are of particular salience to them. Rather than
pushing MEPs from smaller national delegations into the least important
policy areas, the party group leadership (i.e. the group coordinators) main-
tains cohesion by allowing these MEPs access to reports in the policy areas
that are most salient to them.
H2: MEPs from smaller national parties write reports that are more salient to their
parties than do MEPs from larger delegations.
Analogously, there is also a negative relation between committee rank
and representation. Numerous interviews with practitioners have confirmed
that committee chairmanships are among the most influential office positions
in the EP (Whitaker, 2001, 2005). In return for such influence, it is part of the
duty of committee chairs and other office holders to assume responsibility for
reports that could not be allocated to other committee members (Corbett et
al., 2003). On the other hand, like MEPs from small national parties, rank-
and-file committee members and substitutes focus on reports in the most
salient policy areas. In order to maintain cohesion, higher-ranking committee
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officials and the group coordinators allow backbenchers to sign up for the
most salient reports.
H3: Higher-ranking committee members (chairs and vice chairs) write reports
that are less salient to their national parties than do rank-and-file members and
substitutes.
Finally, the leadership ensures cohesion by rewarding loyal MEPs with
policy preferences that are representative of the group as a whole. Even
though legislators, on average, are likely to have more in common with their
fellow party members than with the members of other parties (otherwise they
would switch parties), this is not the case on all issues all the time. On any
specific issue, individual members may disagree with and defect from the
policy position of their party. By screening its members before allocating
important legislative benefits, such as salient reports, the leadership can
identify rebel backbenchers and reward representatives who toe (or at least
are likely to toe) the party line. MEPs whose policy preferences are closest to
the rest of their party group are most likely to be trusted with the most salient
reports.
H4: Preference outliers write less salient reports than do MEPs whose policy pref-
erences are close to the average of their party group.
This section has developed a theoretical model of political representation
on European Parliament committee reports and derived four empirically
testable hypotheses. The representational performance of individual legisla-
tors is determined jointly by the nature of political competition across party
groups and by their internal organization. Legislative coalitions in the EP
define the allocation of salient reports across groups. The leadership’s concern
with maintaining the cohesion of the group determines the distribution of
salient reports within the party. The next section presents the data used to
estimate the model.
Data
There are few theoretical indications that report allocation differs substantially
between parliaments or over the course of a single legislature. As the party
group leadership acquires better information about the policy preferences of
its rank-and-file members, report allocation may increasingly reflect the exper-
tise and background of individual MEPs. As a result, intra-party group politics
may play a smaller role in the second half of each parliamentary term.
Additionally, Høyland (2006) finds evidence for a government–opposition
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dynamic between Council and EP. National parties that are represented in the
Council write more co-decision reports than do ‘opposition’ MEPs. However,
as Høyland (2006) acknowledges, this effect is eclipsed by the importance of
the party groups. PES representatives are ‘more active than governing parties
as co-decision rapporteurs’. Nevertheless, a larger data set over the full parlia-
mentary term could help in evaluating the impact of information updates and
national party competition on report allocation.
However, several exogenous factors, including committee reforms, mid-
term turnover and EU enlargement, could obfuscate the conclusions of a
study over a longer period of time. First, the 1999 committee reform reduced
the number of committees from 20 in the fourth Parliament to 17 in the fifth.
This was raised back to 20 in 2004 when subcommittees were introduced to
ease pressure on further enlargement of the committee system (McElroy,
2006). Since the jurisdictions of each committee were altered with every
reform, comparisons across parliamentary terms are difficult.
In addition, committee positions are assigned at the beginning of each
legislature for 2.5 years. About 30% of MEPs are re-assigned in the second
half of each legislature (McElroy, 2006). Limiting the study to 2.5 years allows
us to treat the entire period of analysis as a single point in time, in contrast
to a complex time-series analysis over several half terms. Empirically, almost
half (45%) of all reports written in the fifth Parliament were undertaken in
the first 2.5 years of the legislative term.
As a result of these concerns and after a careful consideration of the costs
and benefits of extending the time frame of the analysis, this paper covers all
reports in 13 EP committees between 1 September 1999 and 1 January 2002.
Each observation in the data set corresponds to one report. There were 1096
reports in the first 2.5 years of the fifth Parliament, of which 904 were written
in the 13 committees included in the analysis. Owing to lack of data on
salience, 82 observations had to be excluded. Because the European Parlia-
ment’s power over policy outcomes varies across the different decision-
making procedures, the analysis distinguishes between the most influential
(co-decision) reports (Co-decision = 1) and other types of reports (Co-decision
= 0). Data on committee assignments, committee rank (chair, vice-chair,
member and substitute) and reports are available online from the European
Parliament’s website.2
The dependent variable (Salience) is defined as the percentage of the elec-
toral manifesto dedicated to a particular policy area. Representation occurs
when MEPs engage in policy areas that matter to their constituents. The
analysis assumes that, given other incentives to participate in the legislature,
MEPs prefer to spend their time on policy areas that matter to their
constituents. Electoral manifestos represent the national party’s best guess as
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to what matters to its potential voters. No data were available for reports on
Budgets, Budgetary Control, Legal Affairs and Petitions. The national party
positions used in the construction of the dependent variable are available on
the data CD accompanying Budge et al.’s (2001) cross-country study of party
manifestos. The coding frame used to match party positions with committee
reports is in the appendix.3
Figure 1 plots the median salience and the inter-quartile range of each
policy area to illustrate its relative popularity and the skewness of the distri-
bution.4 The y-axis represents the percentage of each national party manifesto
dedicated to each policy area. Of course, it should be more difficult to win a
report in a policy area that is salient to most MEPs than one that is of interest
to only a small number of legislators. Unsurprisingly, Economic and
Monetary Affairs (ECON) turns out to be the most salient policy area, with
a median of more than 17%, followed by Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) and
Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL). Agriculture and Rural Development
(AGRI), Development and Cooperation (DEVE) and Regional Policy, Trans-
port and Tourism (RETT) feature least prominently in the manifestos. The
dashed vertical lines indicate the distance between the first and third quar-
tiles to illustrate the extent of variation in the salience distribution of each
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Figure 1 Salience of reports across policy areas.
Note: Markers denote the median salience of the policy area across all MEPs; 
high–low lines indicate the interquartile range.
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policy area. With the exception of ECON and LIBE, which are by far the most
popular, no clear hierarchy emerges.
National party manifestos are, of course, not a perfect measure of
salience. Manifestos are political documents created for the specific purpose
of convincing voters and winning elections. Clearly, MEPs and their national
party voters might not consider the same issues salient in both the European
and national contexts. However, parties draw up manifestos as strategic docu-
ments focusing on the policy areas that are salient to their potential electorate.
European elections are fought by national parties and they have been widely
shown to be second-order contests about national rather than European issues
(Reif and Schmitt, 1980). As such, national manifestos are a better measure of
what is actually salient to constituents than are the manifestos used at
European elections.
The manifesto data set has been especially criticized for its interpretation
of party policy positions (Laver et al., 2003; but see Klingemann et al., 1994,
for a more positive assessment). However, party manifestos are authoritative
indications about which policy areas the party wants to focus on and they
are widely used in empirical research. The empirical analysis in this paper
focuses not on policy positions but on salience. An area is salient if it is promi-
nent in the manifesto, independently of the policy position that the party
advocates. Using party manifestos makes it possible to include almost all
MEPs in the fifth Parliament without having to rely on expert assessments or
public opinion surveys.5
Several independent variables are included in the analysis. Incumbency is
a dummy variable, which is coded 1 for MEPs who were re-elected in 1999
and 0 for freshmen. Data on ballot structure, candidate selection and the size of
electoral districts are taken from Farrell and Scully (2002) and Hix (2004).
District is a continuous variable, whereas ballot and candidate selection are
coded 0 for open/decentralized systems, 0.5 for order/mixed systems and 1
for closed/centralized systems, respectively. Party size is the number of MEPs
for each national party included in the analysis. The distance between an
MEP’s policy preferences and his/her party group is based on NOMINATE
scores for the period July 1999 – January 2002, which are available online.6
NOMINATE uses MEP roll-call voting records to determine ideal points for
individual legislators across three dimensions (see Hix, 2001, for further
details about the NOMINATE methodology). The first dimension is usually
interpreted as reflecting a left–right cleavage, whereas the interpretation of
the other two dimensions is less clear-cut (see, for instance, Hix et al., forth-
coming). In this paper, left–right distance is the absolute difference between an
MEP’s NOMINATE score on the first dimension and the average of his/her
party group.
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Finally, personal expertise in particular policy areas may increase an
MEP’s chances of obtaining reports in that area. Reliable data on MEP back-
grounds are difficult to obtain. However, the EP’s list of members published
at the beginning of each legislature provides a short overview of every legis-
lator’s educational background, work experience and links to interest groups.
Because these data are self-reported, they reflect only what MEPs want to say
about themselves. Nevertheless, the data do give some indication of a legis-
lator’s background in certain policy areas. The empirical analysis in this paper
includes dummy variables for self-reported links to trade unions, environ-
mental lobbyists, agricultural, legal or business experience and expertise in
the natural sciences and European politics. Descriptive statistics for all vari-
ables can be found in the appendix.
Empirical findings
This section tests the predictions of the model using a combination of bivari-
ate and multivariate statistical tools. Hypothesis 1 suggests that the alloca-
tion of salient reports should vary systematically across party groups to reflect
coalition patterns within the European Parliament. Figure 2 shows the differ-
ence between each party group’s share of salient reports and its share of seats.
The results are consistent with the hypothesis.
Clearly, some party groups obtain more salient reports than their share
of seats in the EP would justify, whereas others get a lower percentage. The
largest party group in the fifth Parliament (EPP) is more than 9% overrepre-
sented, whereas its closest coalition partner on the left–right spectrum, the
Liberal ELDR, gets more than 2% more salient reports than its size would
suggest. The main opposition to the EPP, the centre–left PES, also gets 2%
more salient reports. The Greens obtain a slightly larger share of salient
reports than their size would predict, which may be because they focus their
activity on the Environment committee. The smaller groups at both edges of
the political spectrum (European United Left, EUL, and Union for Europe of
the Nations, UEN) are most underrepresented.
Although the bivariate analysis in Figure 2 does not allow for any defin-
itive conclusions, it is consistent with the suggestion that the allocation of
salient committee reports is a result of committee decision-making rules.7 The
open rule in committee and plenum reduces the policy incentive for groups
that are far from the median voter in the EP to sign up for reports, especially
in the most salient policy areas. The further a party group is from the largest
delegation in terms of left–right policy preferences, the less likely it is that its
MEPs have access to salient reports. The legislative output of each party group
Hausemer Participation and Political Competition 5 1 9
depends on its value, in terms of policy preferences, as a coalition partner to
the largest group. In other words, Figure 2 is consistent with Hypothesis 1,
which suggests that MEPs’ ability to represent their constituents is deter-
mined by coalition patterns along the left–right spectrum.
The findings indicate that representation, as defined in this paper, is quin-
tessentially political. The open rule in committee and plenum ensures that
voting majorities along the left–right spectrum determine the content of
reports. As a result, the largest party group (EPP) holds the most salient
rapporteurships, followed by its closest coalition partner (ELDR). The distri-
bution of salient reports in Figure 2 qualifies previous research that has
explained report allocation as essentially consensual (Benedetto, 2005). At the
same time, the results support Kaeding’s (2005) suggestion that actors within
the EP have different political strategies for legislative participation. Hypoth-
esis 1 explains these strategies in terms of coalition politics. EPP and ELDR
MEPs write more salient reports, and therefore represent their constituents
better, than do legislators from other party groups because they have the
support of a voting majority in the committee and the plenum. The finding
also confirms recent research on roll-call votes, which has identified left–right
politics as the predominant cleavage in the EP (Hix et al., forthcoming).
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Figure 2 Party representation and share of seats by party group.
Notes: Group for a Europe of Democracies and Diversities (EDD) not represented owing to lack of
data. Bars show the difference between a party group’s share of salient reports and its share of
seats.
Of course, a purely bivariate analysis does not allow us to assess the
statistical significance of these findings, the explanatory power of the model
or the relative importance of each of the four hypotheses derived above. Table
3 summarizes the output of two ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with
report salience as the dependent variable. Model (1) includes all reports in all
13 committees whereas model (2) is restricted to the five most legislatively
active committees (ENVI, LIBE, INDU, ECON, AFET).8 Both models yield
very similar results. MEPs’ ability to write salient reports depends in large
part on the committees that they have joined. Therefore, all regressions incor-
porate dummies for membership in the committees included in the analysis.
All regressions control for differences across electoral systems and the rappor-
teur’s rank within his/her committee, both of which might affect the incen-
tive to sign up for reports that are salient to national party voters.9
The regression results support the hypotheses developed in the previous
sections. First, in line with the party competition hypothesis (and with Figure
2), both estimations show that MEPs from the largest party group (EPP) write
the most salient reports. The coefficients for all other party groups, except its
closest coalition partner ELDR, are negative though they do not always
assume statistical significance. Because of the open rule in committee and
plenum, writing reports in salient policy areas is most valuable (at least from
a policy perspective) to MEPs who are part of the majority coalition.
In both models, the extreme left EUL, which is furthest away from the
EPP in terms of left–right policy preferences, writes the least salient reports,
followed by the biggest opposition party (PES). Substantively, in model (1),
Socialists write reports that are 1.1% less salient than do EPP representatives,
which corresponds to 15% of the mean report salience (7.07%). Committee
reports in salient policy areas are less attractive to MEPs who do not form
part of the majority coalition because they can be outvoted in the committee
and in the plenum. Finally, the smaller party groups (UEN and Greens) write
reports that are as salient as those obtained by the EPP. However, neither of
these groups fits very well into the traditional left–right spectrum. Whereas
the national parties that form the UEN distinguish themselves from other
parties mainly by their euroscepticism, the Greens exhibit a disproportionate
preference for environmental policy.
Clearly, coalition patterns have stark consequences for political represen-
tation in the European Parliament. The distribution of salient reports reflects
the need for EPP and ELDR to cooperate in order to maintain their majority
in the Parliament. ‘Opposition’ MEPs, on the contrary, write less salient
reports because they are unlikely to be able to move policy outcomes away
from the median legislator owing to the double open rule in committee and
plenum. In addition, legislators from smaller party groups (i.e. the Greens)
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Table 3 OLS regression: Dependent variable – report salience
Model (1) Model (2)
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Constant 6.002*** 1.727 11.592*** 1.976
Co-decision –0.104 0.455 –0.508 0.681
Party competition
PES –1.109** 0.521 –1.775** 0.717
ELDR 0.627 0.823 1.778 1.109
GREEN –0.356 0.899 –0.848 1.217
EUL –2.793** 1.095 –2.912** 1.482
UEN –0.582 1.411 –1.823 2.705
Cohesion
Left–right distance –4.421*** 1.708 –6.281*** 2.302
Substitute –0.899 0.530 –1.056 0.723
Vice-chair –0.657 0.798 –2.417 1.376
Chair –2.001*** 0.749 –2.344** 1.084
Size –0.047** 0.020 –0.089*** 0.029
Electoral system
District magnitude –0.009 0.008 –0.009 0.012
Candidate selection –0.237 1.151 –2.526 1.614
Ballot structure –0.524 0.686 –0.274 0.950
Background/experience
Incumbent 0.118 0.408 0.627 0.583
Union –0.196 0.663 0.338 0.979
Agriculture –0.979 0.776 0.796 1.055
Legal 4.123*** 0.555 5.217*** 0.717
Business –0.314 0.454 –0.315 0.618
Environment –0.179 0.870 –0.519 1.131
EU politics 1.019** 0.441 0.481 0.616
Science 1.239** 0.616 1.527 0.822
Committees
AFET 1.202 0.711 0.021 0.868
BUDG 1.384 0.808 – –
CONT 1.106 1.224 – –
LIBE 2.785*** 0.807 0.887 0.943
ECON 8.479*** 0.767 8.204*** 0.820
JURI 1.022 0.899 – –
INDU 0.936 0.730 –1.299* 0.770
EMPL 1.834** 0.730
ENVI 0.375 0.674 –0.906 0.851
AGRI –0.188 0.924 – –
PESC –2.489*** 0.668 – –
RETT –1.734** 0.686 – –
CULT 2.043** 0.832 – –
DEVE –0.019 0.866 – –
AFCO –0.496 0.918 – –
FEMM 0.563 0.587 – –
PETI 0.847 0.802 – –
Adj R2 .38 .43
N 822 480
Notes: Group for a Europe of Democracies and Diversities (EDD) and Group of Independents not
included owing to lack of data.
*** significant at 0.01 level, ** significant at 0.05 level.
that focus their activities on a restricted number of policy areas are more
successful in gaining rapporteurships that are salient to them than are main-
stream MEPs who have to compete with members of other parties with
similar preferences.
Apart from competition across party groups, Table 3 also shows consider-
able evidence for the remaining three hypotheses, which address the link
between party group cohesion and political representation. First, preference
outliers represent their constituents less well than do MEPs who toe the party
line (H4). Every 0.1 increase in an MEP’s policy distance from his/her party
group leads to a 0.4% drop in report salience. Because the leadership is
concerned with protecting the brand name of the party group and maintain-
ing its credibility, legislators who often defect from their group in roll-call
votes are less likely than their colleagues to be assigned salient reports. The
leadership screens candidates ex ante to make sure their reports reflect the
opinion of the group as a whole. In addition, party leaders use their power
to allocate reports ex post to reward MEPs who have toed the party line and
to punish defectors. Rebel MEPs are less likely to be assigned salient reports
and, therefore, represent their constituents less well than do legislators whose
policy preferences are in line with the rest of the party group.
The results also strongly support H2 and H3, which address the party
group’s concern with maintaining loyalty by giving individual legislators a
stake in the operation of the party group. In both estimations reported in Table
3, MEPs from smaller national parties write more salient reports than legis-
lators from larger parties (H2). Thus, in line with Kaeding (2005), MEPs from
smaller member states (and national party delegations) focus their partici-
pation on the policy areas that are most salient to them. At the same time, in
order to maintain cohesion, the leadership compensates rank-and-file
members who have little influence over the group with disproportionately
salient reports.
In addition, committee chairs write less salient reports than regular
committee members (H3). The negative relationship between committee rank
and report salience is less strong for vice-chairs, and there is virtually no
difference between the salience of reports written by full members and those
obtained by substitute members. As Corbett et al. (2003) have noted,
committee chairs often assume responsibility for reports that none of the rank-
and-file members want to take on. Regular committee members and substi-
tutes, in contrast, focus their legislative participation on the most salient
policy areas.
Finally, none of the electoral system variables and only legal expertise is
consistently significant in both estimations. MEPs with a legal background
are more successful in obtaining salient rapporteurships than are legislators
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without such expertise. The coefficient on legal experience may partly be
explained by the fact that the committee on Legal Affairs (JURI) was excluded
from the analysis owing to lack of data. Whereas expertise in a particular
policy field is useful in gaining access to the most technically complex reports,
it is not clear why these reports should also be the most salient. More surpris-
ingly, incumbency (in both models) and experience with European politics
(in model 2) are also insignificant, which confirms much previous research
that has questioned the value of seniority in the European Parliament (e.g.
Bowler and Farrell, 1995).
Discussion and conclusion
This paper models the consequences of committee report allocation for politi-
cal representation in the European Parliament. Both inter- and intra-party
group dynamics determine an individual legislator’s ability to represent the
preferences of his/her national party’s electorate. First, party groups compete
for salient reports on the basis of their delegation size and left–right policy
preferences. Second, the party group leadership distributes these reports
among its MEPs in an attempt to maximize the cohesion of the group. As a
consequence, MEPs from large national delegations, committee chairs and
preference outliers represent their constituents less well than their party
group colleagues.
The paper contributes to a number of existing research programmes.
Most importantly, perhaps, it expands on the nascent literature on political
representation in the EP by examining ‘direct representation’ from an empiri-
cal perspective. In line with Hall (1996), the paper argues that the partici-
pation of individual legislators in parliamentary affairs has important
consequences for political representation. The structure of opportunities and
constraints in the EP conditions which policy areas MEPs engage in and, by
implication, whose political opinions are represented in parliamentary
debates and in the policy positions that the legislature adopts. The open rule
in committee and plenum reduces the incentive for MEPs who are not part
of the majority coalition to take on reports in the most salient policy areas.
Within party groups, rank-and-file committee members and MEPs from
smaller national delegations focus on the most salient reports, whereas their
peers participate in a wider range of policy areas.
Most studies of committee reports in the EP analyse the level of partici-
pation across policy areas (Raunio, 1997; Mamadouh and Raunio, 2003;
Kaeding, 2004, 2005; Høyland, 2005; Hix et al., forthcoming). This paper
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indicates how less directly observable characteristics of legislative partici-
pation, such as its representational quality, can be systematically analysed.
Apart from opening up a new generation of empirical representation studies
that is applicable across a wide range of legislative activities, a similar
research design might also be used to analyse, for instance, legislative entre-
preneurship in the European Parliament and other legislatures.
In addition, the paper contributes to existing literature on the internal
organization of the EP. The model explains disproportionalities in the alloca-
tion of salient reports across party groups in terms of coalition politics. The
findings corroborate recent studies of party group competition and coalition
formation in the EP, which maintain that coalitions are based on the close-
ness of policy preferences across party groups (e.g. Hix et al., forthcoming).
Inter-party group competition for salient reports is likely to increase in
importance as the European Parliament acquires further political influence
(see Hix et al., forthcoming, for a similar interpretation in their analysis of
roll-call votes over time). Similarly, a switch from an open to a closed rule in
committee and plenary voting would strengthen the role of the rapporteur
and increase competition for salient reports between the majority coalition
and other party groups in the EP.
Finally, the paper provides insights into the internal workings of EP party
groups. In addition to the different political strategies identified by Kaeding
(2005), disproportionalities in the allocation of committee reports within party
groups are a result of the leadership’s concern with maintaining group
cohesion. The findings confirm Kreppel’s (2002) conclusion that there are
considerable constraints on how the party group leadership allocates its
resources. In order to maintain cohesion, group coordinators allow loyal rank-
and-file members and MEPs from smaller national parties to sign up for those
reports that are most salient to them. These constraints are likely to increase
in importance as the European Union continues to enlarge and becomes politi-
cally more heterogeneous.
This paper is a first attempt empirically to analyse the consequences of
legislative participation for political representation in the EP. Future research
should test the model developed here in the context of other legislative activi-
ties, such as parliamentary questions or committee assignments. Addition-
ally, further research should follow in Whitaker’s (2001, 2005) footsteps to
investigate the internal organization of the party group leadership itself. How
do group coordinators, national party leaders, committee chairs and the party
group secretariat relate to one another? And what is the effect of the party
affiliation of group leaders on the representational performance of their
MEPs?
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Notes
I would like to thank Bjørn Høyland, Tapio Raunio, Richard Whitaker, David
Marshall, Achim Goerres, Michael Bruter, Ed Page, Fabio Franchino, Sara
Hagemann and four anonymous referees for their extremely valuable comments
and suggestions. This research would not have been possible without the finan-
cial support of the Luxembourg Ministry of Culture, Higher Education and
Research. The data used in the empirical analysis are available from the author
upon request.
1 Cohesion in this context refers to the ability of the party group to rally around
a common policy position and entice its members to support group goals in
their legislative work.
2 See http://www.europarl.eu.int. I would like to thank Bjørn Høyland for
sharing these data.
3 The appendix is available on the EUP website. See http://www.
uni-konstanz.de/eup/issues.htm.
4 Figure 1 includes all MEPs for whom data were available in order to reflect
the size of each national party delegation in the EP.
5 Both these alternative tools for measuring salience have their own disadvan-
tages. Expert surveys are often less comprehensive both in the number of
policy areas that they distinguish and in the number of parties covered. In
addition, previous research has criticized both public opinion surveys and
expert evaluations for a lack of reliability.
6 See http://personal.lse.ac.uk/hix/HixNouryRolandEPdata.HTM.
7 Note, however, that small variations from perfect proportionality could arise
even if a proportional allocation rule (such as d’Hondt) were used. In order
to test the effect of party group affiliation on representation, a more sophis-
ticated multivariate analysis is needed.
8 Although these are the five committees that produced most reports (co-
decision and others combined), this does not necessarily reflect their legisla-
tive importance (see e.g. Kaeding, 2005, for a different set of seven ‘most
influential’ committees). The model was run on Kaeding’s selection of the
seven ‘most influential’ committees. The only substantive change in this esti-
mation was a drop in the significance of the coefficient on the EUL below
conventional levels of significance. Note also that the lack of co-decision
reports in AFET should not be a problem because the empirical analysis
includes all reports and controls for co-decision reports with an appropriate
dummy variable.
9 These results remained very similar in a separate analysis excluding the most
prolific MEPs (10+ reports). Also, a regression on the subset of co-decision
reports only did not alter conclusions. The results were strengthened after
inclusion of fixed effects to account for possible variation in representational
focus across MEPs from different countries (Table 1). Such country dummies
pick up any country-level variation in the data that is not accounted for by
other variables in the model. Finally, instead of fixed effects, the model was
also run using random country effects and random effects for the different
policy areas. None of these re-specifications led to any substantive change in
results. These results are available upon request from the author.
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